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Decision makers often reject mixed gambles offering equal probabilities of a larger gain 
and a smaller loss. This important phenomenon, referred to as loss aversion, is typically 
explained by prospect theory, which proposes that decision makers give losses higher utility 
weights than gains. In this paper we consider alternative psychological mechanisms capable of 
explaining loss aversion, such as a fixed utility bias favoring rejection, as well as a bias favoring 
rejection prior to gamble valuation. We use a drift diffusion model of decision making to 
conceptually distinguish, formally define, and empirically measure these mechanisms. In two 
preregistered experiments, we show that the pre-valuation bias provides a very large contribution 
to model fits, predicts key response time patterns, reflects prior expectations regarding gamble 
desirability, and can be manipulated independently of the valuation process. Our results indicate 
that loss aversion is the result of multiple different psychological mechanisms, and that the pre-
valuation bias is a fundamental determinant of this well-known behavioral tendency. These 
results have important implications for how we model behavior in risky choice tasks, and how 
we interpret its relationship with various psychological, clinical, and neurobiological variables.  
 
Keywords: loss aversion, risky choice, decision making, drift diffusion model, computational 
modeling 
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1. Introduction 
Consider a gamble that offers a gain of $11 if a coin toss lands heads, and a loss of $10 if 
it lands tails. Would you accept or reject this gamble? Most people choose to reject similar 
positive-expected-value mixed gambles (gambles that have the potential for both gains and 
losses; Kahneman & Tversky, 1979; P. A. Samuelson, 1960; Tversky & Kahneman, 1992). 
According to expected utility theory, this simply reflects concavity of utility functions, which 
leads to risk aversion. Yet rejection rates observed for mixed gambles involving such small 
monetary payoffs cannot be easily explained by conventional applications of expected utility 
theory. As Rabin (2000) points out, for such models to predict the rejection of a 50-50 gamble 
between a gain of $11 and a loss of $10, the assumed degree of risk aversion would have to be so 
high that an individual would reject any 50-50 gamble involving a loss of $100, regardless of the 
magnitude of the corresponding gain. This unreasonable prediction presents compelling evidence 
against risk aversion being the only cause of mixed gamble rejection, and suggests that people 
are loss averse, that is they display an additional (psychological) aversion to gambles that offer 
the possibility of a loss.  
1.1. Prospect theory explanations for loss aversion 
Loss aversion has commonly been understood through the lens of prospect theory 
(Kahneman & Tversky, 1979), which states that losses are valued differently than gains1 (also 
see Kahneman, 2003; Kőszegi & Rabin, 2007; Rabin & Thaler, 2001; Tversky & Kahneman, 
1992). Specifically, prospect theory proposes that decision makers place a greater utility weight 
 
1 In this paper we distinguish between loss aversion (which refers to the general psychological tendency to avoid 
gambles that offer the possibility of a loss) and prospect theory’s account of loss aversion (which takes the form of 
biased utility weights, specified using the 𝜆 parameter discussed below).  
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on losses and a lower utility weight on gains2. Thus, in the decision to accept or reject a gamble 
𝑖, offering a 50% chance of gaining 𝐺𝑖  and a 50% chance of losing 𝐿𝑖  (𝐺𝑖, 𝐿𝑖 > 0), the utility for 
accepting the gamble, according to prospect theory, is given by 𝑈𝑖 = 𝐺𝑖 − 𝜆 ∙ 𝐿𝑖 (as the 
probabilities of the gains and losses are identical, we assume that their effects can be ignored 
without influencing model predictions, but also see Tversky & Kahneman, 1992 and Pachur & 
Kellen, 2013 on applying different probability weighting functions in the gain and loss domains). 
Here 𝜆 is the prospect theory loss aversion parameter, where 𝜆 > 1 indicates that losses have a 
larger utility weight than gains. Assuming that the utility for rejecting the gamble is 0, the 
decision maker will accept the gamble when 𝑈𝑖  >  0, and reject the gamble when 𝑈𝑖  <  0. In 
the gamble presented at the start of this paper, a large enough value of 𝜆 implies that individuals 
experience more negative utility from the loss of $10 than positive utility from the gain of $11. 
Thus, the gamble, despite having a positive expected value, appears unattractive and is rejected.  
As prospect theory has become the predominant theory for describing choice under risk 
and uncertainty, its utility weighting explanation (i.e. the assumption that 𝜆 > 1) has also 
become widely accepted as the psychological mechanism responsible for loss aversion. Indeed, 
an individual’s degree of loss aversion3, measured by their gamble rejection rate, is often seen to 
be synonymous with the value of 𝜆. This assumption is, in turn, used to relate prospect theory to 
various behavioral, cognitive, clinical, demographic, and neurobiological variables. Among 
many examples of this approach, researchers have argued that biased utility weights (in the form 
 
2 In this paper we use utility weights to refer to the weighting coefficients for gains and losses in various forms of 
value functions. This is not to be confused with decision weights in the probability weighting function of prospect 
theory. In this paper, we only consider mixed gambles with equal probabilities of gains and losses.  
 
3 If prospect theory utility, 𝑈𝑖 = 𝐺𝑖 +  𝜆 ∙ 𝐿𝑖 , was the only determinant of gamble acceptance or rejection, 𝜆 would be 
highly correlated with the rejection rate and would be the explanation of loss aversion. However, as we discuss 
below, there are many alternate explanations for gamble rejection.  
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of 𝜆 > 1) play an important role in irrational financial decision making, problem gambling, 
suicidal decision making, and incorrect affective forecasting (Benartzi & Thaler, 1999; 
Hadlaczky et al., 2018; Kermer, Driver-Linn, Wilson, & Gilbert, 2006; Lorains et al., 2014; 
Takeuchi et al., 2015); in explaining differences in risky decision making between decision 
contexts (Polman, 2012; Schulreich, Gerhardt, & Heekeren, 2016; Sokol-Hessner, Camerer, & 
Phelps, 2013; Sokol-Hessner, Raio, Gottesman, Lackovic, & Phelps, 2016; Vermeer, Boksem, & 
Sanfey, 2014) and between individuals with varying psychological traits, demographic profiles, 
and life experiences (Barkley-Levenson, Van Leijenhorst, & Galván, 2013; Barkley-Levenson & 
Galvan, 2014; Bibby & Ferguson, 2011; Pighin, Bonini, Savadori, Hadjichristidis, & Schena, 
2014; Sokol-Hessner, Hartley, Hamilton, & Phelps, 2015a); and in determining physiological 
and neural responses to risky prospects (Canessa et al., 2017; 2013; De Martino, Camerer, & 
Adolphs, 2010; Engelmann, Meyer, Fehr, & Ruff, 2015; Gelskov, Henningsson, Madsen, 
Siebner, & Ramsøy, 2015; Lazzaro, Rutledge, Burghart, & Glimcher, 2016; Markett, Heeren, 
Montag, Weber, & Reuter, 2016; Sokol-Hessner et al., 2013; Sokol-Hessner, Lackovic, Tobe, 
Camerer, Leventhal, et al., 2015b; Takahashi et al., 2013; Tom, Fox, Trepel, & Poldrack, 2007). 
A single prolific and influential example of this approach is presented in Tom et al. (2007): In 
this paper, neural activity was correlated with gamble rejection rates, which the authors 
interpreted as identifying brain regions that encode values of prospect theory’s 𝜆 parameter.  
1.2. Alternate explanations for loss aversion 
Recent work has challenged the utility weighting explanation proposed by prospect 
theory4 (see review by Gal & Rucker, 2018; but also see Simonson & Kivetz, 2018). Rather than 
 
4 Note that these debates do not only apply to research on gambles, but also to other topics such as the endowment 
effect and hedonic impact ratings. As our focus is on risky choice, we limit our discussion to the most relevant 
evidence in this area. 
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a universal property of people’s preferences, utility weights for losses and gains may be context-
dependent and can be absent or even reversed in certain decision environments. For example, 
decision makers no longer place higher weights on losses than gains when the accept-reject 
paradigm is framed as an equivalent binary choice between a mixed gamble and a sure outcome 
of $0 (Ert & Erev, 2013). The multiplicative effect of losses on utility can even be of a smaller 
magnitude than that of gains when individuals experience a wider range of losses compared to 
gains in repeated trials (Walasek & Stewart, 2015; Walasek & Stewart, 2019).  
It is also the case that current approaches to modeling loss aversion using prospect theory 
utility weights implicitly allow for other mechanisms to influence choice. Recall that the utility 
for accepting a gamble i, according to prospect theory, is given by 𝑈𝑖 = 𝐺𝑖 − 𝜆 ∙ 𝐿𝑖. Stochasticity 
in choice can be modeled with a logistic response function. With such specification, the 
magnitude of λ can be estimated using a logistic regression: 𝐴𝑖  ~ 𝛽𝐺 ∙ 𝐺𝑖 − 𝛽𝐿 ∙ 𝐿𝑖. Here Ai is the 
participant’s binary response to the gamble (1 if Accept, 0 if Reject), and 𝛽𝐺 and 𝛽𝐿  are 
regression coefficients that yield the utility weighting effect as specified by prospect theory with 
𝜆 = 𝛽𝐿/𝛽𝐺. In practice, researchers often include an additive intercept,  𝛼, in the utility function, 
i.e., 𝑈𝑖 = 𝛼 +  𝐺𝑖 − 𝜆 ∙ 𝐿𝑖. Correspondently, the logistic regression for predicting choice becomes 
𝐴𝑖 ~ 𝛼 +  𝛽𝐺 ∙ 𝐺𝑖 −  𝛽𝐿 ∙ 𝐿𝑖 (for a discussion of this point see Walasek & Stewart, 2019).  This 
additive intercept generates a fixed utility bias favoring rejection (𝛼 < 0) or acceptance (𝛼 > 0). 
Unlike utility weights, the magnitude of this fixed utility bias, and the effect it generates, is not 
dependent on the specific gain and loss amounts offered by the gamble. When 𝛼 is negative, 
decision makers can reject positive-EV mixed gambles even without higher utility weighting for 
losses.  
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make up the decision maker’s utility function. Yet, individuals can also exhibit loss aversion 
prior to gamble valuation; that is, individuals could be predisposed to rejection even before they 
have inspected and learnt about the monetary amounts that could be gained or lost. 
Psychologically, this pre-valuation bias can be seen as a type of status-quo bias or psychological 
inertia (Gal, 2006; Samuelson & Zeckhauser, 1988; Gal & Rucker, 2018), a tendency according 
to which individuals avoid actions that lead to potential losses relative to the current state of 
affairs (though, as we discuss below, there are other compelling statistical and neurobiological 
interpretations of this mechanism). Although such a tendency may be overridden after the 
gamble is valued, we would nonetheless expect the pre-valuation bias to influence people’s 
decisions and, in many settings, lead to a higher probability of rejection than acceptance.  
Considerable research has modeled risky choice with the assumption of flexible utility 
weights (and often, implicitly, additive intercepts in utilities – e.g. Pachur & Scheibehenne, 
2017; Schulreich, Gerhardt, & Heekeren, 2016; Stewart, Reimers & Harris, 2015; Walasek & 
Stewart, 2015). Yet there has been almost no work that has also allowed for the effect of a pre-
valuation bias on choices among mixed gambles. This is largely because mechanisms such as the 
pre-valuation bias cannot be accommodated within the types of economic models used to predict 
risky choice. Typically, these economic models assume that choices depend entirely on utility, 
which itself is a product of the gains and losses offered by the gamble in consideration. Thus, 
there is no place for a psychological mechanism for loss aversion that influences choice prior to 
the formation of utility. 
 Due to this technical constraint, previous discussions of pre-valuation biases, and related 
mechanisms, appear almost only in verbal models, and this inevitable lack of formal definition 
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and quantitative measurement severely limits the scope of analyses performed in theoretical and 
empirical research. Thus, for example, prior research documenting correlations between gamble 
rejection rates and various psychological, clinical, and neurobiological variables, may have 
misattributed these correlations to differences in 𝜆 across decision environments and individuals, 
when they may be better understood in terms of differences in the pre-valuation bias. Similarly, 
the pre-valuation bias could explain why people display less loss aversion when the accept-reject 
decision is framed as an equivalent binary choice between a mixed gamble and a sure outcome of 
$0 (Ert & Erev, 2008, 2013; see also Erev et al., 2008). As the pre-valuation bias predisposes the 
decision maker to rejection over acceptance, its effect is likely to be larger in the accept-reject 
paradigm than the binary choice paradigm. More generally, allowing for the pre-valuation bias in 
a formal model of risky choice can shed light on a fuller set of psychological mechanisms 
responsible for loss aversion, and by doing so, allow for improved predictions of behavior, and a 
more sophisticated understanding of individual differences, contextual influences, and the effects 
of various psychological, clinical, and neurobiological variables on risky choice.  
2. Model 
Some researchers have turned to models originally proposed in mathematical and 
cognitive psychology to develop a comprehensive modeling framework for decomposing the 
numerous psychological mechanisms responsible for decision under risk (e.g., Bhatia, 2014; 
Busemeyer & Townsnd, 1993 Clay, Clithero, Harris & Reed, 2017; Diederich & Trueblood, 
2018; Pleskac, Wallsten, Wang & Lejuez, 2008; Rieskamp, 2006; Trueblood, Heathcote, Evans 
& Holmes, 2019). In this paper, we study decision processes in mixed gamble decisions using 
one such model: the drift diffusion model (DDM) – a sequential sampling model which assumes 
that individuals gradually accumulate evidence over the time course of the decision, with a 
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decision being made when evidence reaches a threshold value (Ratcliff, 1978). The DDM, and 
related models, have proved successful in accounting for choice and response time data observed 
in a wide range of non-risky perceptual and preferential choice tasks (Dai & Busemeyer, 2014; 
Krajbich, Armel, & Rangel, 2010; Ratcliff, 1978; Ratcliff & McKoon, 2008; Tsetsos, Chater, & 
Usher, 2012; Tsetsos et al., 2016; White & Poldrack, 2014; Zhao et al., 2019), and provide the 
leading quantitative framework for modeling the numerous psychological influences at play in 
two-option forced choice, such as the accept-reject decisions studied in this paper.  
As is illustrated in Figure 1A, we assume that for mixed gamble choice, decision makers’ 
starting point of preference accumulation is 𝛾. Once the accumulation of evidence begins, they 
integrate evidence in favor of accepting vs. rejecting the gamble over time, with a drift rate (𝑣) 
that relates the utility of the gamble to the accumulation process. Choices are made when the 
accumulated evidence reaches a positive threshold +𝜃 (corresponding to acceptance) or a 
negative threshold −𝜃 (corresponding to rejection). The response time (RT) in a trial is assumed 
to be the time taken for the accumulating evidence to reach a decision threshold added to a fixed 
non-decisional time τ (which captures the time taken to perceive the stimuli, execute motor 
responses after the decision has been made, and so on). We do not assume any between-trial 
variability in the parameters. 
In perceptual choice, the speed of evidence accumulation is dependent on the signal 
strength, e.g., consistency of random dot movement or contrast between line segments. In 
preferential choice, the evidence being accumulated depends on features of the choice 
alternatives, and subsequently their relative utilities. Following this logic, the drift rate for a trial 
involving gamble 𝑖 is given by 𝑣𝑖 = 𝑈𝑖(Accept) − 𝑈𝑖(Reject). To keep model specifications 
consistent with the logistic model introduced in Section 1, we write the drift rate as 𝑣𝑖 = 𝛼 +
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 𝛽𝐺 ∙ 𝐺𝑖 − 𝛽𝐿 ∙ 𝐿𝑖. Note that in the absence of a pre-valuation bias, which we will soon introduce, 
the DDM has the same functional form for predicting choice probabilities as the static logistic 
model outlined above. In other words, the static logistic model used in prior work can be seen as 
a special case of the DDM, as it imposes additional parameter constraints (no pre-valuation bias) 
and does not predict RTs. Therefore, the ratio between the loss vs. gain coefficient in the drift 
rate, 𝛽𝐿/𝛽𝐺, is the DDM-equivalent measure of the prospect theory utility weighting bias, 𝜆, 
whereas 𝛼 is a DDM-based measure of the fixed utility bias (i.e., the intercept in a logistic 
regression). In cases when 𝜆 =
𝛽𝐿
𝛽𝐺
> 1 and/or 𝛼 < 0 one may observe a higher propensity to 
reject mixed gambles.  
Beyond incorporating previously proposed mechanisms into a dynamic modeling 
framework and thus potentially providing more accurate measures of their effects (Clithero, 
2018), our approach is able to define and measure a new mechanism. This new mechanism, the 
pre-valuation bias, takes the form of a starting point (𝛾) in the drift diffusion model. A positive 𝛾, 
that is closer to +𝜃, predisposes the decision maker towards accepting the gamble. A negative 𝛾 , 
that is closer to – 𝜃, predisposes the decision maker towards rejecting the gamble. When 𝛾 = 0, 
the preference accumulation process starts from a neutral state5.  
Apart from offering conceptual definitions for distinct biases, the DDM also predicts that 
the pre-valuation bias will generate a unique behavioral marker regarding the relationship 
between choice and response time, that cannot be explained using a fixed utility bias or the 
 
5 Note that the idea of a stimulus-independent bias is not new. Indeed, many researchers have included an additive 
intercept in a logistic regression analyses to capture a general tendency of choice making, independently of the 
monetary amounts on offer (e.g., Pachur & Scheibehenne, 2017; Schulreich, Gerhardt, & Heekeren, 2016; Stewart, 
Reimers & Harris, 2015; Walasek & Stewart, 2015). However, this term is conceptually similar to the intercept in 
the drift rate (𝛼) which influences decision making in parallel to the stimuli-dependent valuation of the gamble. 
Indeed, as we discuss above, the DDM reduces to the logistic regression model used in this prior work when the pre-
valuation bias is zero. 
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utility weighting bias. Without a pre-valuation bias, the DDM predicts that RT distributions 
associated with acceptance vs. rejection decisions for a gamble should be identical. Imposing a 
pre-valuation bias that sets a starting point closer to the rejection threshold would make the 
choice of rejection quicker, compared to the choice of acceptance. Intuitively, this is because the 
pre-valuation bias is implemented before the valuation process starts and its effect on choice and 
RTs diminishes as the decision maker deliberates about the money that could be gained or lost. 
In contrast, drift rate effects persist throughout the decision process (see prior discussions on the 
separation between the starting point parameter and the drift rate parameters in a drift diffusion 
model: e.g., Leite & Ratcliff, 2011; Voss, Rothermund, & Voss, 2004; Voss, Voss, & Klauer, 
2010; White & Poldrack, 2014). 
In addition to the above prediction, the various parameters of our DDM implementation 
of loss aversion can also be quantitatively estimated and differentiated from one another with a 
combination of choice and response time data. In prior work, psychologists and neuroscientists 
have used these estimates to compare pre-valuation biases against alternative decision 
mechanisms in a variety of perceptual and preferential choice tasks (e.g., White & Poldrack, 
2014; Zhao et al., 2019).  
The pre-valuation bias also has compelling statistical and neurocognitive interpretations. 
Mathematically, the DDM implements a sequential probability ratio test, which achieves a pre-
selected level of accuracy in the shortest possible time. With this interpretation, a starting point 
bias in the accumulation process is related to unequal prior expectations regarding how 
rewarding different responses are. If decision makers were behaving adaptively, the starting 
point should be closer to the choice boundary of the response with a higher prior probability of 
being more rewarding. In line with this normative prediction, many perceptual experiments 
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demonstrate that the effect of manipulating prior probabilities or reward values for responses can 
be described by a shift in the participant’s starting point biases (e.g., Ratcliff & Smith, 2004; 
Leite & Ratcliff, 2011). For example, in a word recognition task where participants classify 
words into two categories (“old” or “new”), researchers manipulate prior probabilities by making 
“old” the correct answer in more than 50% questions. Alternatively, researchers manipulate 
reward values by allocating higher reward amounts for the correct response to the “old” words, 
compared to those to the “new” words. In both cases, participants experience “old” as the more 
rewarding response, and develop a starting point bias that favors choosing “old”. The DDM has 
also been suggested as a simplified model of neural information processing. With this 
interpretation, a starting point bias can be seen as a bias in baseline firing rates of neural units. In 
other words, a starting point bias causes pre-evaluation response tendencies inclining the 
decision maker towards one type of response (Bogacz, 2007; Bogacz, Brown, Moehlis, Holmes, 
& Cohen, 2006; Gold & Shadlen, 2007; Mulder, Wagenmakers, Ratcliff, Boekel, & Forstmann, 
2012).  
In the present paper we apply the DDM to the context of risky choice. Building on the 
findings discussed above, we use the DDM to decompose the psychological mechanisms that 
contribute to high rejection rates of mixed gambles (see Table 1 for a summary).  Our objective 
is to determine the extent to which participants display pre-valuation biases towards rejecting (or 
accepting) mixed gambles. We also hope to shed light on the importance of this mechanism, 
compared to the dominant explanation in the field – prospect theory utility weighting captured by 
the parameter 𝜆. Extending past work on risky choice and loss aversion, our approach also allows 
us to test whether biases towards accepting and rejecting gambles adapt dynamically to previous 
experience, that is whether it is possible to alter the pre-valuation bias by altering the gambles 
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the decision maker is exposed to. Thus, participants expecting to reject more than 50% of the 
trials prior to gamble evaluation may begin their decision with a starting point favoring rejection, 
whereas participants expecting to accept more than 50% of the trials prior to gamble evaluation 
may begin their decision with a starting point favoring acceptance. If the pre-valuation bias can 
in fact be shifted by manipulating payoff distributions, it can be interpreted as a consequence of 
prior expectations that rejection is more likely to be the more rewarding response. Such 
expectations may have been formed based on prior experiences in the lab or in the real-world, 
and would reflect an adaptive approach to making accept-reject decisions involving mixed 
gambles. 
 
3. Experiment 1 
In this experiment we presented participants with gambles involving equal probabilities 
of monetary gains and losses. Their task was to indicate whether they would accept or reject the 
gambles. We fit DDMs to choice and RT data so as to decompose participants’ responses into 
various underlying psychological mechanisms, and infer the existence and relative importance of 
the prospect theory utility weighting bias for losses over gains, the fixed utility bias, and the pre-
valuation bias. We preregistered our experimental methods, model specifications and main 
hypotheses at https://osf.io/varx6. 
3.1. Methods 
3.1.1. Procedures 
49 participants (age: mean = 22.55, SD = 6.10; 67.3% female) were recruited from a 
university experimental research subject pool and performed the experiment on computers in a 
laboratory.  
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They were instructed to accept or reject a sequence of 200 gambles, presented in four 
blocks of 50 gambles each. Each gamble had two possible outcomes: A gain of some number of 
tokens occurring with a 50% chance and a loss of some number of tokens occurring with a 50% 
chance. The outcomes were displayed side by side in counterbalanced positions, with 
positive/negative values indicating gains and losses (see Figure 1B). Participants pressed up or 
down arrows on a keyboard to indicate acceptance or rejection, with the specific key-response 
associations alternating across blocks to control for response biases favoring one of the keys. 
Choices and response times were recorded.  
Each token was worth US$0.10, and participants began the experiment with an 
endowment of 100 tokens (US$10).  Participants were informed that their choices in the 
experiment would determine their bonus payment, which they would receive on top of a fixed 
show-up fee of US$8. This was accomplished by selecting one of the gambles at random at the 
end of the experiment. If the participant rejected the gamble, the bonus payment would be 100 
tokens (US$10). If the participant accepted the gamble, then they would flip a coin in front of the 
experimenter to play out the gamble. Their received token amount would be their initial 
endowment (100 tokens = US$10) plus or minus the gain or loss associated with the coin flip.  
3.1.2. Stimuli 
The possible gain and loss values were taken from the set of {10, 20, 30, 40, 50, 60, 70, 
80, 90, 100} tokens, or equivalently US$ {1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9, 10}. With this stimulus set we 
were able to generate a total of 100 unique gambles. We counterbalanced the positions of the 
gain and loss outcomes for gambles, resulting in 200 total trials (see Figure 1C for an illustration 
of the payoff distributions). 
3.2. Descriptive results 
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Consistent with prior work, we found that decision makers were mostly unwilling to 
accept the mixed gambles offered in the experiment. Overall, the average rejection probability 
across participants was 71.5% (SD = 0.19), with 79.6% of participants being more likely to 
reject than accept the gambles. These probabilities are larger than 50%, which is the rate we 
would expect if choices were made by chance or if individuals did not display any loss aversion 
(𝑡(48) = 8.03, 𝑝 < 0.001 when compared to 50%). Figure 2A (left panel) presents average 
acceptance rates as a function of the ratio of gains to losses, and indicates that, on average, 
participants accepted the gambles only when the size of the gain exceeded 1.75 times the size of 
the loss. Do note that the overall choice probability pattern is compatible with the prediction of a 
pre-valuation bias towards rejection (𝛾 < 0), a fixed utility bias favoring rejection (𝛼 < 0), 
and/or a prospect theory weighting bias for losses (𝜆 > 1). 
We also found that rejections were quicker than acceptances. Overall, the average 
rejection decision took 1.30 seconds, whereas the average acceptance decision took 1.72 seconds 
(ΔM = 0.41 seconds, 𝑡(46) = 4.05, 𝑝 < 0.001). Additionally, 74.5% of participants took less 
time to reject than to accept. Figure 2 B (left panel) plots the overall distribution of mean 
response times for acceptance and rejection decisions across participants, and shows that these 
distributions are different from each other (Wilcoxon signed rank test: 𝑉 = 935, 𝑝 < 0.001). 
Figure 2C (left panel) plots average differences in response times for acceptances vs. rejections, 
against average acceptance probabilities, on the individual level. Here we see that most 
participants were more likely to reject than accept, and additionally rejected quickly and 
accepted slowly. We also observed a negative relationship between response time differences 
and choice probabilities, with participants who were most likely to reject the gamble also being 
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the ones that displayed the greatest differences in response times for acceptance vs rejection 
(𝑐𝑜𝑟𝑟 = −0.75, 𝑡(45) = 7.61, 𝑝 < 0.001 across all participants). 
Both the pre-valuation bias and the prospect theory utility weighting bias can generate the 
response time patterns shown in Figures 2B and 2C. According to a model with only a pre-
valuation bias (𝛾 < 0) but no utility weighting bias (𝜆 = 1), participants would need to 
accumulate more evidence (take longer time) when accepting rather than rejecting a gamble. 
According to a model with a utility weighting bias (𝜆 > 1) but no pre-valuation bias (𝛾 = 0), it 
is possible that trials on which gambles are rejected involve highly undesirable gambles (and 
therefore quicker response times), whereas trials on which gambles are accepted involve only 
moderately desirable gambles (and thus slower response times). In other words, there are two 
reasons as to why RT differences between acceptance and rejection might emerge: (1) 
participants have a pre-valuation bias towards rejecting gambles, and (2) participants reject more 
often in easier problems than difficult problems (Krajbich, Bartling, Hare, & Fehr, 2015). 
 If participants indeed have a pre-valuation bias favoring rejection, then correcting for 
choice factors (i.e. the gains and losses that determine the utility, and subsequently the drift rate) 
should not alter the qualitative relationship between choice and RT. To test this, we performed a 
linear regression for each participant’s data, in which we regressed participants’ log RTs onto 
gain and loss values of the gambles in the trials. We took the regression residuals as RTs 
adjusted for choice factors. We then grouped each participant’s adjusted RTs into five bins (the 
first to the fifth quintiles of RTs representing the fastest to the slowest trials, respectively), and 
calculated each participant’s rejection rate and acceptance rate for each of the adjusted RT bins, 
before pooling the bins for participants. The result is summarized in Figure 2D (left panel), 
which shows a negative relationship between choice probability and response time for rejection 
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decisions, and a positive relationship between choice probability and response time for 
acceptance decisions. This indicates that decision makers are quicker to reject and slower to 
accept, even when the choice factors (amounts that could be gained and lost) are controlled for. 
This behavioral marker is associated with a pre-valuation bias favoring rejection. As we will 
show in Section 3.3.3, this pattern cannot be generated by a DDM model with only the drift rate 
mechanisms (fixed utility bias and prospect theory utility weighting) but no pre-valuation bias.  
3.3. Modeling results 
3.3.1. Model fits 
The model discussed in Section 2 was fit to choice and RT data using HDDM, a Python 
package for hierarchical Bayesian estimation of drift-diffusion models (Wiecki, Sofer, & Frank, 
2013). This approach estimates group and individual level parameters simultaneously, with 
group-level parameters forming the prior distributions from which individual subject estimates 
are sampled. A recent study comparing HDDM with alternative estimation approaches showed 
that hierarchical fitting requires fewer data to recover parameters (Ratcliff & Childers, 2015; 
Wiecki et al., 2013). Moreover, the Bayesian approach permits direct inferences for parameter 
variability. In terms of choosing priors for the parameters, we followed the advice of Wiecki et 
al. (2013), and used a set of default priors that constrained parameter values in a feasible range 
(Matzke & Wagenmakers 2009). The complete prior specifications can be found in Wiecki et al. 
(2013).  
We ran four separate chains for every model in all the experiments. Each chain consisted 
of 50,000 samples, where the first 25,000 were burn-ins and a factor of 2 was applied for 
thinning. To assess model convergence, we computed ?̂?s of all the parameters for each model. 
The maximum ?̂? was 1.002 across all models, indicating successful convergence (Gelman and 
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Rubin, 1992). To assess model fits, we sampled 1000 sets of parameter values from their 
respective posterior distributions and used those to simulate participants’ responses and RTs 
(resulting in 1000 simulated datasets, each corresponds to a set of predictions for all the trials 
completed by each participant). We performed posterior predictive checks by comparing 
posterior predictive distributions of a set of test statistics to those computed from the observed 
data (Figure 3, left panels). In all the presented posterior predictive checks, we took averages 
across all simulated datasets to compute point estimates for the test statistics, and used 95% 
credible intervals to quantify variabilities in predicting those test statistics. In addition, we 
computed correlations between the mean predicted test statistics and the observed statics across 
participants (Figures 3A-C) or across gambles (Figure 3D) to evaluate prediction accuracy. Our 
model successfully captured the observed individual heterogeneity in acceptance rates (Figure 
3A; 𝑐𝑜𝑟𝑟 = 0.99, 𝑡(47) = 45.42, 𝑝 < 0.001), and mean rejection RT (Figure 3B; 𝑐𝑜𝑟𝑟 =
0.98, 𝑡(47) = 38.04, 𝑝 < 0.001). Some participants accepted gambles in a very small proportion 
of trials, and thus the correlation between observed and predicted mean acceptance RT was 
relatively lower (Figure 3C; 𝑐𝑜𝑟𝑟 = 0.85, 𝑡(45) = 11.03, 𝑝 < 0.001). In addition to reproducing 
the relevant observed summary statistics for different participants, our model also captured the 
observed acceptance rates for different unique gambles (note that each of the 100 unique 
gambles was presented exactly twice to each participant; Figure 3D; 𝑐𝑜𝑟𝑟 = 0.97, 𝑡(98) =
43.09, 𝑝 < 0.001). For more results on the posterior predictive tests, please see Supplemental 
Materials. 
3.3.2. Model parameters 
Table 2 summarizes the group-level parameter statistics. The posterior mean for the 
prospect theory utility weighting parameter (𝜆 =
𝛽𝐿
𝛽𝐺
) is 1.5, and the 95% credible interval for 𝛽𝐿 
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is strictly larger than that for 𝛽𝐺, indicating a group-level utility weighting bias for losses in our 
data. The other drift rate mechanism, the fixed utility bias (𝛼), has a posterior mean around 0. 
The DDM measure of pre-valuation bias (𝛾) has a strictly negative 95% credible interval in this 
experiment, indicating an overall pre-valuation bias towards rejection among our participants. 
The posterior means for participant-level parameters are shown in Figure 4 (left panels). 
On the individual level, we observed best-fit parameter values such that 𝛽𝐿 > 𝛽𝐺 for 39 (79.6%) 
participants, with 28 (57.1%) participants having a 95% credible interval for 𝛽𝐿 − 𝛽𝐺 that is 
strictly positive. The posterior mean of individual-level prospect theory utility weighting 
parameter (𝜆) averaged across our participants is 1.88 (SD = 1.22; Figure 4A). We observed a 
negative posterior mean of 𝛼 for only 24 (49.0%) participants, with a strictly negative 95% 
credible intervals for 9 (18.4%). Across our participants the mean value of 𝛼 is -0.03 (SD = 0.49; 
Figure 4B). Finally, we observed a negative posterior mean of 𝛾 for 37 (75.5%) participants, 33 
(67.3%) of which had a strictly negative 95% credible intervals. The averaged participant-level 
posterior mean of 𝛾 is -0.20 (SD = 0.24) across all participants (Figure 4C). The analyses on the 
individual-level parameters, together with those on the group-level, indicate that most 
participants display prospect theory utility weighting biases and pre-valuation biases towards 
rejection, but do not display a systematic fixed utility bias.  
3.3.3. Constrained model analyses 
To better understand the descriptive power of different mechanisms for loss aversion, we 
also fit three restricted variants of the DDM. The first constrained model eliminated the prospect 
theory utility weighting bias by setting 𝛽𝐿 = 𝛽𝐺. The second eliminated the fixed utility bias by 
setting 𝛼 = 0. The third eliminated the pre-valuation bias by setting 𝛾 = 0. We compared the 
relative fits of these three constrained models against each other, and against the full model. The 
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model comparisons were performed using the deviance information criterion (DIC; 
Spiegelhalter, Best, Carlin, & van der Linde, 2002), which measures model fits while penalizing 
model complexity to avoid over-fitting, with smaller DICs indicating better model fits.  
The DICs of the full and constrained models are shown in Table 3. This measure revealed 
that despite having more parameters than the remaining models, the full model (DIC = 17,184) 
generated the best fit to the observed data. We used ΔDIC (differences between a constrained 
model and the full model) to quantify the importance of an eliminated mechanism – larger 
differences imply that the eliminated mechanism is more important for model fits. Out of the 
three constrained models, the one that set 𝛾 = 0 (ΔDIC = 957) yielded the worst fit, suggesting 
that the pre-valuation bias plays a more important role than the other three mechanisms in this 
experiment. Following that was prospect theory utility weighting; the constrained model with 
𝛽𝐿 = 𝛽𝐺 led to the second largest increase in DIC (ΔDIC = 364). The model without the fixed 
utility bias (𝛼 = 0) yielded smaller but still notable increase in DIC (ΔDIC = 188). Overall, our 
constrained model analyses demonstrate that all the mechanisms are indispensable in accounting 
for the observed data, but including the pre-valuation bias in a model explains more variance 
than including prospect theory utility weighting or the fixed utility bias.  
3.3.4. Behavioral marker for the pre-valuation bias 
Acknowledging that using goodness-of-fit as a single piece of evidence for theory testing 
can be problematic (Roberts & Pashler, 2000), we also used the behavioral marker shown in 
Figure 2D to further test for the role of the pre-valuation bias in accounting for loss aversion 
(note that this part of analysis was not pre-registered). This behavioral marker involves higher 
rejection rates for trials with shorter RTs compared to trials with longer RTs (Figure 2D, and 
solid blue lines in Figures 5). As discussed in Sections 2 and 3.2, this pattern is consistent with 
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the effect of a pre-valuation bias towards rejecting mixed gambles. To test this formally, we 
generated posterior predictions (1,000 samples for each trial) from the full and constrained 
models, and investigated how well each model mimicked the observed data. In line with our 
intuition, we found that the choice-RT relationship in Figure 2D can be captured by the full 
model, as well as by the constrained model eliminating either prospect theory utility weighting 
(𝛽𝐺 = 𝛽𝐿) or the fixed utility bias (𝛼 = 0). However, the constrained model with no pre-
valuation bias (𝛾 < 0) fails to capture this relationship. This finding is illustrated in Figure 5 (top 
panels), and provides one explanation for why the pre-valuation bias plays an important role in 
our quantitative model fits.  
3.3.5. Capturing individual heterogeneity  
As we point out in the introduction section, inferences regarding utility weighting are 
often made by relating acceptance rates in mixed gamble tasks to psychological, clinical, and 
neurobiological variables. The validity of this procedure relies heavily on the assumption that 
utility weighting is the primary cause of loss aversion, that is, the rejection of mixed gambles. 
We have shown that this assumption may not hold, because an alternative mechanism, the pre-
valuation bias, appears to be even more important in terms of enhancing quantitative model fits 
and explaining the relationship between choice and RTs. However, if the magnitude of utility 
weighting correlates with observable rejection rates more strongly than the pre-valuation bias, 
the current approach may still be acceptable.  
We investigated this possibility by measuring the relationship between individual-level 
model parameters and observed choice heterogeneity across participants. For this purpose, we 
correlated participant-level estimates for 𝜆, 𝛼 and 𝛾 with average participant-level acceptance 
rates (Figure 6, top panel). Across participants, the acceptance rate is moderately correlated with 
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the fixed utility bias, 𝛼 (𝑐𝑜𝑟𝑟 = 0.45, 𝑡(47) = 3.48, 𝑝 = 0.001), but not clearly related to utility 
weighting 𝜆 (𝑐𝑜𝑟𝑟 = −0.11, 𝑡(47) = −0.74, 𝑝 = 0.462). Instead, the correlation between 
acceptance rates and the pre-valuation bias, 𝛾, is the strongest (𝑐𝑜𝑟𝑟 = 0.88, 𝑡(47) =
 12.49, 𝑝 < 0.001). These differences in correlation persist if we use the non-parametric 
Spearman correlation rather than the Pearson correlation shown above (𝛼: 𝑐𝑜𝑟𝑟𝑠 = −0.28, 𝑝 =
0.053; 𝜆: 𝑐𝑜𝑟𝑟𝑠 = 0.46, 𝑝 = 0.001; 𝛾: 𝑐𝑜𝑟𝑟𝑠 = 0.90, 𝑝 < 0.001). We also performed a 
standardized multiple regression of acceptance rates on the parameters corresponding to the three 
mechanisms (Table 4), which shows that the pre-valuation bias has a considerably larger 
regression coefficient than prospect theory utility weighting. This indicates that a one-standard-
deviation shift in the pre-valuation bias has a larger effect on the individual’s gamble acceptance 
rates than a one-standard-deviation shift in utility weighting. 
We also wanted to compare the ability of our DDM model against the standard model 
used in prior work, which is equipped with only utility weighting and the additive intercept. Thus 
we performed a standardized multiple regression to capture participant-level acceptance rates, 
using participant-level 𝜆 and 𝛼 from the constrained DDM with the pre-valuation bias eliminated 
(𝛾 = 0)6. The results are presented in Table 5. Comparing the 𝑅2 of this model with the model 
presented in Table 4, we see that the explanatory power of the logistic-regression-comparable 
model (𝑅2=0.468) is much smaller than that of the full DDM model (𝑅2=0.804). This shows that 
participant heterogeneity predicted by the pre-valuation bias cannot be easily captured by 
existing models (such as a logistic model with only utility weighting and an additive intercept).  
 
6 Note that with a neutral pre-valuation bias (𝛾 = 0), and a drift rate function 𝑣𝑖 = 𝛼 +  𝛽𝐺 ∙ 𝐺𝑖 −  𝛽𝐿 ∙ 𝐿𝑖, this 
constrained DDM has the same functional form for computing acceptance probabilities as the common logistic 
regression approach. In other words, prospect theory utility weighting and additive utility intercepts estimated from 
this model are comparable to those estimated from logistic regression (although the constrained DDM estimates also 
take into account of RT data). 
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 Note that the models reported here do not account for the effect of risk aversion, which 
assumes diminishing sensitivity to monetary payoffs and is often captured by a power-
transformation of objective monetary amounts. To address the concern that risk aversion may be 
another mechanism responsible for loss-averse behaviors, we also tested a modeling framework 
that incorporates risk aversion, in addition to all the mechanisms described above. All of our 
conclusions do generalize to that extended framework. For methods on integrating risk aversion 
into the DDMs, as well as results on how it (does not) affect interpretations regarding the other 
mechanisms, we refer the interested readers to Supplemental Materials. The Supplemental 
Materials also provide results of a parameter recovery analysis showing that the parameters of 
the model tested in the main text can be adequately recovered from data.  
3.4. Summary 
We used the drift diffusion model, applied to accept-reject decisions for mixed gambles, 
to show that loss aversion can be decomposed into multiple psychological mechanisms. 
Although the best-known such mechanism, prospect theory utility weighting, is indeed an 
important component of our model, our results show that there is also another mechanism, the 
pre-valuation bias, that should not be ignored. This bias has the largest quantitative contribution 
in terms of fitting choice and RT data. It is also necessary for capturing the choice-RT behavioral 
marker, and explains the most individual heterogeneity in gamble rejection rates. The concept of 
a pre-valuation bias has been discussed in many previous papers (e.g. Gal, 2006); here, for the 
first time, we demonstrate quantitatively that it is no less important than utility weighting in 
accounting for mixed gamble choice. By doing so we also show that prior work explaining the 
effects of various psychological, clinical, and neurobiological variables on loss aversion through 
prospect theory utility weighting may be misguided. It is more likely that these variables 
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influence the pre-valuation bias, given how strongly correlated this parameter is with participant-
level choice outcomes.  
 
4. Experiment 2 
Given the important role of the pre-valuation bias in accounting for high rejection rates 
for mixed gambles, a natural follow-up question is: How do decision makers form different pre-
valuation biases? How can we interpret the psychological role of such a bias? Although the pre-
valuation bias resembles the status-quo bias and psychological inertia, as studied in prior work 
(Gal, 2006; W. Samuelson & Zeckhauser, 1988; Gal & Rucker, 2018), the DDM also offers a 
novel statistical interpretation: The starting point in the drift diffusion processes should reflect 
prior expectations regarding how rewarding different responses are. Consistent with this 
interpretation, empirical evidence in perceptual decision making studies finds that the starting 
point can be shifted when participants’ expectations change. For example, if participants 
discover that a certain response is more likely to be the more rewarding response than the other, 
they adapt to this knowledge and become more prepared to choose the more rewarding response 
by shifting their starting point towards the threshold corresponding to that response.  
The objective of Experiment 2 was to test whether people’s expectations about mixed 
gambles have a similar influence on the pre-valuation bias and thus on loss aversion. We did this 
by altering the set of gambles shown to participants in a design similar to that of Experiment 1. 
In one condition of Experiment 2, the gambles were mostly undesirable, and we expected 
participants to display a negative pre-valuation bias, corresponding to a prior expectation 
favoring rejection. In another condition, the gambles were mostly desirable, and we expected 
participants to display a positive (or, at the very least, less negative) pre-valuation bias, 
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corresponding to a prior expectation favoring acceptance. If pre-valuation biases can indeed be 
shifted by altering the desirability of previously encountered gambles, we could interpret these 
biases to be adaptive to prior beliefs about the gamble desirability. We preregistered our 
experimental methods, model specifications and main hypotheses at https://osf.io/varx6. 
4.1 Methods 
101 participants (age: mean = 25.96, SD = 9.75; 56.4% female) were recruited from a 
university experimental research subject pool and performed the experiment on computers in a 
laboratory. Each participant followed the same procedure as in Experiment 1, i.e., they made 200 
decisions to accept or reject gambles involving equal probabilities of gains and losses. As in 
Experiment 1, we recorded their choice and RT data, and incentivized participants by randomly 
selecting one of the trials to play out.  
Unlike Experiment 1, participants in Experiment 2 were assigned to one of two 
conditions. In the high-payoff (HP) condition, the possible gain values in a gamble were taken 
from the set of {60, 70, 80, 90, 100, 110, 120, 130, 140, 150} tokens; whereas the possible loss 
values were taken from the set of {-10, -20, -30, -40, -50, -60, -70, -80, -90, -100} tokens. In the 
low-payoff (LP) condition, the possible gain values in a gamble were taken from the set of {10, 
20, 30, 40, 50, 60, 70, 80, 90, 100} tokens; whereas the possible loss values were taken from the 
set of {-60, -70, -80, -90, -100, -110, -120, -130, -140, -150} tokens. With presentation positions 
counterbalanced, we had in a total of 2 × 10 × 10 = 200 trials for both conditions. The 
distributions of values of the gambles overlapped between the conditions, so that participants in 
both conditions completed gambles with gains from the set of {60, 70, 80, 90, 100} tokens, and 
losses from the set of {-60, -70, -80, -90, -100} tokens. With position counterbalanced, this 
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resulted in a total of 2 × 5 × 5 = 50 shared gambles (see Figure 1C for a visual illustration of the 
payoff distribution design). 
As in Experiment 1, each token was worth US$0.10. However, since the LP participants 
could potentially have a larger loss, all participants in Experiment 2 began the experiment with 
an endowment of 150 tokens (US$15). There were 52 participants in the HP condition (age: 
mean = 26.65, SD = 9.67; 59.6% female), and 49 participants in the LP condition (age: mean =
25.22, SD = 9.87; 53.1% female).  
If our hypotheses regarding the causes of the pre-valuation bias are correct, then we 
would expect choices in the HP condition to display higher pre-valuation biases (corresponding 
to acceptance being more rewarding) and choices in the LP condition to display lower pre-
valuation biases (corresponding to rejection being more rewarding). This would indicate that 
participants form pre-valuation biases based on (learnt) expectations regarding the gambles. If 
the pre-valuation biases are identical across the two conditions then it is likely that pre-valuation 
biases are not a product of environment adaptivity, and are instead caused by some other 
(potentially non-malleable) component of decision processes.  
 Note that because HP and LP participants experienced different payoff distributions, the 
relative attractiveness of the gambles could also be different for the participants in the two 
conditions. For example, for the HP participants, the shared gambles had the lowest gain values 
and the highest loss values, and thus were the worst gambles available. The reverse was true for 
LP participants, for whom the shared gambles were the best available. This desirability 
difference could alter the drift rate, if the drift rate depends on relative attractiveness (see 
Walasek & Stewart, 2015 for a related account of this phenomena). Importantly, this effect is 
different from the pre-valuation bias effect that is the primary focus of our experiment.  
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4.2. Descriptive Results 
4.2.1. Overview of the whole dataset 
In the HP condition, the mean rejection rate was 50.9% (SD = 0.20), with 51.9% of 
participants rejecting more than half of the gambles. In the LP condition, the mean rejection rate 
was 88.9% (SD = 0.11), with all participants rejecting more than half of the gambles. The 
difference in overall rejection rates is significant (ΔMean = 38.1% , 𝑡(78) = 11.92, 𝑝 < 0.001). 
The large acceptance rate discrepancy between the two conditions demonstrates the success of 
our payoff distribution manipulation.  
In both conditions, participants tended to accept the gambles when the size of the gain 
exceeded the size of the loss. For HP participants, the size of the gain had to be more than 1.83 
times the size of the loss; whereas for LP participants the size of the gain only had to be more 
than 1.25 time the size of the loss (Figure 2A, middle and right panels). In the HP condition, the 
average rejection decision took 1.54 seconds, whereas the average acceptance decision took 1.59 
seconds. This difference is not statistically significant (Figure 2B, middle panel; 𝑡(51) =
0.63, 𝑝 = 0.529). In the LP condition, the average rejection decision took 1.26 seconds and the 
average acceptance decision took 2.50 seconds. This is a significant difference (Figure 2B, right 
panel; 𝑡(43) = 7.33, 𝑝 < 0.001). Compared to participants in the LP condition, participants in 
the HP condition were quicker when accepting gambles (ΔMean = −0.91 seconds, 𝑡(67) =
−4.81, 𝑝 < 0.001), and slower when rejecting gambles (ΔMean = 0.28 seconds, 𝑡(73) = 2.52, 
𝑝 = 0.014). Consistent with Experiment 1, participants who were more likely to reject the 
gamble also displayed larger differences in response times for acceptance vs rejection (Figure 
2C, middle and right panels; HP: 𝑐𝑜𝑟𝑟 = −0.85, 𝑡(50) = 11.56, 𝑝 < 0.001;  LP: 𝑐𝑜𝑟𝑟 =
−0.58, 𝑡(42) = 4.57, 𝑝 < 0.001).  
MECHANISMS OF LOSS AVERSION  28 
 
Finally, we also tested whether the behavioral marker identified in Experiment 1 surfaced 
in Experiment 2. To do so, we plotted the acceptance and rejection rates against adjusted RT bins 
(Figure 2D, middle and right panels). As in Experiment 1, participants in both conditions were 
quicker to reject than accept gambles, when choice factors (amounts to be gained and lost) were 
controlled for. Although the acceptance rates were higher in the HP condition and lower in the 
LP condition, there was a negative relationship between RT and acceptance rates in both 
conditions. 
Our descriptive analyses demonstrate that the findings in Experiment 1 are generalizable 
to a similar mixed gamble experiment with distinct payoff distributions. They also indicate that 
our hypotheses regarding pre-valuation biases may be correct: Participants in the LP condition 
were much quicker to reject than accept than in the HP condition, indicating that they may have 
had pre-valuation biases closer to the rejection boundary. Additionally, participants in the LP 
condition had higher rejection probabilities. This could be caused by more negative pre-valuation 
biases, though it may also be the case that the two conditions generated differences in drift rates.  
4.2.2. Examining the shared gambles 
Participants in both conditions completed gambles with gain values from the set {60, 70, 
80, 90, 100} tokens, and loss values from the set {-60, -70, -80, -90, -100}. We refer to these 25 
gambles (50 trials with position counterbalanced) as shared gambles. In this section we analyze 
behavioral patterns for shared gambles. Note that this analysis was not preregistered.  
Although HP participants accepted more gambles than LP participants, their acceptance 
rates were lower than the LP participants if we only analyze the shared gambles (HP: 13.3%; LP: 
34.6%;  𝑡(81)  =  4.86, 𝑝 <  .001). On the other hand, the RT patterns emerged from the shared 
gambles were more consistent with the whole dataset. HP participants were quicker in 
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acceptance decisions than LP participants (HP: 1.81;  LP: 2.44;  𝑡(66) = 2.15, 𝑝 = 0.035). The 
difference in rejection RTs was nonsignificant (HP: 1.45;  LP: 1.50; 𝑡(94) = 0.43, 𝑝 = 0.671). 
We generated a composite variable to describe RT patterns for participants that at least accepted 
or rejected in one trial. The composite variable is referred to as the averaged RT difference, and 
is defined as the difference between mean acceptance RTs and mean rejection RTs for a 
participant. HP participants exhibited smaller averaged RT differences than LP participants (HP: 
0.19; LP: 0.88; 𝑡(76) = 2.77, 𝑝 = 0.007). Note that the fact that HP participants accepted fewer 
gambles but took relatively less time to accept, contradicts the usual choice-RT correlations 
observed in binary choice data. In the following section we will get back to this result and 
explain it using the DDM decomposition. 
4.3. Modeling results 
4.3.1. Replication of Experiment 1 
To rigorously test for differences in parameters across the two conditions, and to more 
formally replicate Experiment 1, we fit the DDM to the HP and LP data separately. As in 
Experiment 1, our posterior predictive checks showed that our full model fits successfully 
captured the observed heterogeneity in acceptance rates (Figure 3A, middle and right panels), 
mean rejection RT (Figure 3B, middle and right panels), and mean acceptance RTs (Figure 3C, 
middle and right panels) across participants, as well as the observed heterogeneity in acceptance 
rates across gambles (Figure 3D, middle and right panels), for the two conditions.  
We also examined the role of different DDM mechanisms using constrained model 
analyses. Table 3 shows model fits for the full and constrained models in both conditions. Here, 
the full models include the pre-valuation bias (𝛾), the utility weighting bias (𝜆), and the fixed 
utility bias (𝛼). In the HP condition, unlike Experiment 1, eliminating utility weighting (ΔDIC =
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1,071) produced a larger DIC increase than eliminating the pre-valuation bias (ΔDIC = 769). 
Similar to the findings of Experiment 1, eliminating the fixed utility bias resulted in a smaller yet 
still noticeable DIC increase (ΔDIC = 362). In the LP condition, eliminating the pre-valuation 
bias increased DIC the most (ΔDIC = 914). Compared to this, eliminating the remaining two 
mechanisms had a much smaller effect (utility weighting bias: ΔDIC = 186; fixed utility bias: 
ΔDIC = 129). Thus, replicating what we found in Experiment 1, the three DDM mechanisms are 
all indispensable when accounting for the variance in choice and RT data; eliminating any of 
them worsens model fits. However, the relative importance of the pre-valuation bias and utility 
weighting bias varies across the HP and LP conditions. As we will show in Section 4.3.2, this is 
because participants displayed different magnitudes of pre-valuation biases and utility weighting 
biases in the two experimental conditions. 
As in Experiment 1, we used posterior predictive samples to test which DDM 
mechanism(s) were essential in accounting for the behavioral marker in Figure 2D, i.e., higher 
rejection rates in quicker trials with choice factors controlled for. As shown in Figure 5 (middle 
and right panels), the choice-RT behavioral marker can be captured by the full model, as well as 
by the constrained models eliminating the utility weighting and fixed utility biases. However, the 
constrained model with no pre-valuation bias fails to capture this relationship. In other words, the 
pre-valuation bias is necessary for explaining the choice-RT pattern. This is the case in both the 
HP and LP conditions. 
Our final replication attempt involves predicting participant-level acceptance rates using 
the three DDM mechanisms through standardized regressions. The results are shown in Table 4. 
As before, the coefficients associated with the pre-valuation bias were higher than those for the 
other mechanisms. This was the case in both conditions. This result can also be seen in Figure 6 
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(middle and right panels), in which the pre-valuation bias has the highest correlation with 
participant-level acceptance rates.  
4.3.2 Model parameters  
Now we examine differences across the two conditions. We begin by comparing group-
level and individual-level parameters, which are summarized in Table 2 and Figure 4 
respectively. These show that participants in the LP condition exhibited more negative pre-
valuation biases than their counterparts in the HP condition. On the group level, the posterior 
mean of the pre-valuation bias (𝛾) is −0.07 (95%CI [−0.11, −0.02]) in the HP condition, and 
−0.32 (95%CI [-0.35, -0.28]) in the LP condition. On the individual level, in the HP condition, 
33 (63.5%) participants had a negative posterior mean for the pre-valuation bias, with 24 
(46.2%) of them exhibiting a strictly negative 95% CI for the parameter. In the LP condition, 49 
(100%) had a negative posterior mean for the pre-valuation bias, out of which 47 (95.9%) had a 
strictly negative 95% CI. Overall, the difference between the biases in the two conditions was 
very large (HP: Mean = −0.06, SD = 0.22; LP: Mean = −0.31, SD = 0.13, 𝑡(84) = 7.05, 𝑝 <
0.001; based on posterior means of parameters). Therefore, in line with our predictions, 
manipulating payoff distributions across conditions caused shifts in participants’ pre-valuation 
biases.  
Although the experiment was set up to test the influence of payoff distributions on the 
pre-valuation bias, we also predicted (based on Walasek & Stewart, 2015) that utility weighting 
may depend on the pay-off distribution. We found that this was in fact true in our data. Although 
group-level posterior distributions of 𝛽𝐺 were similar between the two conditions (HP: Mean =
0.016; LP: Mean = 0.016), LP participants had a much lower 𝛽𝐿 (HP: Mean =  0.029; LP: 
Mean = 0.013) and much more negative fixed utility biases in the drift rate (HP: Mean = 0.014; 
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LP: Mean = −0.420) than participants in the HP condition. This can also be seen on the 
individual level, HP participants had stronger utility weighting biases with larger values of 𝜆 
(HP: Mean = 2.11, SD = 1.36; LP: Mean = 1.03, SD = 0.50, 𝑡(65) = 5.30, 𝑝 < 0.001), but 
they exhibited a less positive fixed utility bias than LP participants (HP: Mean = 0.01, SD =
0.81; LP: Mean = −0.42, SD = 0.36, 𝑡(71) = 3.49, 𝑝 < 0.001). In the HP condition, 49 
(94.2%) participants exhibited a utility weighting bias (𝜆 > 1), but only 28 (53.8%) had a 
negative fixed utility bias (𝛼 < 0); whereas in the LP condition, only 20 (40.8%) had 𝜆 > 1, but 
43 (87.8%) had 𝛼 < 0. The differences in 𝜆 emerged because HP and LP participants had very 
similar 𝛽𝐺 (HP: Mean = 0.016, SD = 0.006; LP: Mean = 0.016, SD = 0.009, 𝑡(82) =
0.16, 𝑝 = 0.872), but HP participants had a much lager 𝛽𝐿 (HP: Mean = 0.029, SD = 0.011 LP: 
Mean = 0.013, SD = 0.005, 𝑡(75) = 9.42, 𝑝 < 0.001).  
4.3.3. Shared gambles 
The differences in 𝜆 documented above suggest that, for any individual gamble, the 
disutility caused by the loss is smaller for LP participants than HP participants. Therefore, a 
gamble with a large loss may appear better to LP participants than their HP counterparts. To test 
this, we examined the drift rates of the fifty gambles that were shared across the conditions. 
Specifically, with the individual-level parameters estimated based on the whole dataset, we 
reconstructed the mean drift rate (?̅?) of the shared gambles for each participant. As hypothesized, 
we found that HP participants had more negative mean drift rates for the shard gambles than LP 
participants (HP: Mean = −1.06, SD = 0.65; LP: Mean = −0.20, SD = 0.51, 𝑡(96) =
7.39, 𝑝 < 0.001). This indicates that HP participants considered the shared gambles to be very 
unappealing; whereas LP participants were almost neutral between accepting vs. rejecting these 
gambles. The difference in utility for shared gambles is likely due to the discrepancy in relative 
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gamble attractiveness in the two conditions: the shared gambles offered smaller gains (losses) 
and larger losses (gains) to HP (LP) participants compared to the other non-shared gambles.  
The specific loss and gain values in a gamble should not influence decision makers’ pre-
valuation bias as, by definition, this bias captures a predisposition prior to utility evaluation. To 
verify whether our pre-valuation bias estimates were truly gamble-insensitive, we fit the full 
DDM to shared gambles only, for the two groups. The pre-valuation biases recovered from 
shared gambles were very similar to those estimated from the whole dataset (HP: 𝑐𝑜𝑟𝑟 =
0.86, 𝑡(50) = 11.84, p < 0.001; LP: 𝑐𝑜𝑟𝑟 = 0.76, 𝑡(47) = 8.09, p < 0.001).  
To summarize, compared to LP participants, HP participants had a more positive pre-
valuation bias, and yet simultaneously a more negative combined drift rate. This is shown in 
Figure 7A which displays a scatter plot of participant-level mean drift rates for the shared 
gambles and pre-valuation biases (using parameters inferred from choices on all the gambles). 
By observing the two parameters changing in the opposite directions for the shared gambles, we 
demonstrate a dissociation between drift rate and the pre-valuation bias mechanisms. 
This disassociation also yields some interesting behavioral patterns in our data. As shown 
in Figure 7B, the shared gamble acceptance rates were on average lower in the HP condition 
(HP: Mean = 13.3%, SD = 16.7%; LP: Mean = 34.6%, SD = 26.0%). However, at the same 
time, HP participants also exhibited smaller differences between acceptance RTs and rejection 
RTs than LP participants (HP: Mean = 0.19, SD =  1.13; LP: Mean = 0.88, SD = 1.11). The 
fact that HP participants accepted fewer gambles but took relatively less time to accept, 
contradicts the usual choice-RT correlations observed in binary choice data. This odd pattern 
however stems naturally from the disassociation we observed between the pre-valuation bias and 
the drift rate mechanisms. If choice rates depend primarily on drift rates, then we would expect 
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HP participants to have lower acceptance probabilities than LP participants. Likewise, if RT 
differences depend primarily on pre-valuation biases, then we would expect LP participants to 
have larger differences in acceptance and rejection RTs than HP participants. Indeed, our shared 
gamble data shows that the acceptance rate is positively correlated with the combined drift rate 
(Figure 7C; 𝑐𝑜𝑟𝑟 = 0.86, 𝑡(99) = 16.69, 𝑝 < 0.001) on the participant-level when pooling the 
HP and LP participants. On the contrary, the correlation between acceptance rates and pre-
valuation biases is much weaker (Figure 7D; 𝑐𝑜𝑟𝑟 = 0.26, 𝑡(99) = 2.65, 𝑝 = 0.009). Likewise 
we find that the averaged RT difference between acceptance vs. rejection decisions is highly 
correlated with the pre-valuation bias across all participants (Figure 7F; 𝑐𝑜𝑟𝑟 = −0.48, 𝑡(79) =
−4.80, 𝑝 < 0.001), but there is no overall correlation between the averaged RT difference and 
the combined drift rate (Figure 7E; 𝑐𝑜𝑟𝑟 = −0.07, 𝑡(79) = −0.64, 𝑝 = 0.523).   
4.4. Summary 
 The results of Experiment 2 replicate Experiment 1, and show that the pre-valuation bias 
has an important role in quantitative model fits, in describing choice-RT relationships and 
accounting for the behavioral marker, and in explaining gamble acceptance rates across 
participants. In addition, they also show that the pre-valuation bias can be manipulated by 
changing the gambles that participants are exposed to. If participants are given primarily 
undesirable gambles (as in the LP condition), they form priors expectations favoring gamble 
rejection and display more negative pre-valuation biases, whereas if they are given more 
desirable gambles (as in the HP condition) they form relatively neutral prior expectations and 
display less negative pre-valuation biases. Thus, the pre-valuation bias can be interpreted as an 
adaptive consequence of expectations regarding gamble desirability. Its importance in explaining 
behavioral data suggests that these adaptive beliefs play a major role in risky choice. 
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 Experiment 2 also documented a disassociation between the pre-valuation bias and the 
drift rate (utility weighting and fixed utility bias) mechanisms, which generated some interesting 
behavioral patterns for gambles shared across the two conditions. As predicted, participants were 
more likely to have pre-valuation biases favoring rejection when exposed to undesirable gambles 
(LP condition) than when exposed to desirable gambles (HP condition). But for gambles shared 
by the two conditions, they showed a reduced utility weighting bias (lower 𝜆), and thus a higher 
drift rate, in the LP condition than the HP condition. This reduces the rejection rates, while also 
increasing the RT for acceptance (and reducing the RT for rejection) for the shared gambles in 
the LP condition relative to the shared gambles in the HP condition. The higher utility (drift rate) 
for the shared gambles in the presence of other undesirable gambles can be easily explained if 
participants base their utilities on relative comparisons with prior gambles, as has been shown by 
Walasek and Stewart (2015). In this sense, Experiment 2 can be seen as a conceptual replication 
of the findings of this earlier paper.  
 
5. Discussion 
Understanding why people are loss averse is a central goal for researchers interested in 
theory development and in real world applications of risky choice. The predominant explanation 
for this phenomenon is prospect theory’s utility weighting - the larger effect of losses vs. gains 
on gamble utility. In fact, a lot of prior work in psychology, economics, and neuroscience infers 
utility weighting through mixed gamble rejection rates, and subsequently uses this explanation of 
loss aversion to characterize the effect of social, cognitive, emotional, developmental, 
demographic, clinical, physiological, and neural variables on risky choice. This fundamental 
assumption shared by these studies has been challenged over the recent years. Some researchers 
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argue that a fixed utility bias should also be included in gamble valuation; others argue that 
decision makers reject gambles because of the status quo bias. 
In this paper, we revisit the concept of loss aversion, viewing it as a decision tendency 
that emerges from an interplay of multiple unique psychological mechanisms. Using a drift-
diffusion decomposition of mixed gamble accept-reject decisions, we precisely define and 
quantitatively measure these mechanisms simultaneously on an individual level, and 
subsequently evaluate their relative importance. We find that the utility weighting bias, the fixed 
utility bias, and the pre-valuation bias, are all crucial for explaining observed variance in choice 
and RT data, but that the pre-valuation bias has the largest effect on model fits. Additionally, this 
bias is associated with a unique behavioral marker: faster RTs for rejection than acceptance 
(controlling for various choice factors). Our experiments show strong evidence for this 
behavioral marker, indicating that the pre-valuation bias is essential for capturing the relationship 
between choices and response times. This pre-valuation bias is also more correlated with 
participant-level acceptance rates than other loss aversion mechanisms in the risky choice task.  
In Experiment 2, we further demonstrate that the pre-valuation bias depends on 
participants’ expectations about gamble desirability, so that manipulating the gambles that 
decision makers are exposed to can alter the strength of this bias. These results suggest that the 
pre-valuation bias stems from biased prior expectations regarding different responses, and thus 
forms part of an adaptive strategy for making risky choices with the potential of loss. We also 
dissociate the effects of the pre-valuation bias and the drift rate mechanisms. In this study, we 
evaluate people’s choices on a set of shared gambles having exposed different groups of 
participants to unique sets of either high-payoff (HP) or low-payoff (LP) gambles. Because the 
pre-valuation bias depends on prior experience, and is insensitive to specific gamble values in a 
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given trial, HP participants have more positive pre-valuation biases than LP participants when 
deliberating over the shared gambles. However, because the relative desirability of the shared 
gambles differs between the groups, HP participants exhibit higher utility weighting biases and 
more negative drift rates than their LP counterparts. Importantly, the divergence between these 
mechanisms leads to interesting behavioral effects: HP participants are less likely to accept 
shared gambles but do so relatively quickly compared to LP participants. This dissociation in 
both parameter estimates and behavioral patterns demonstrates that loss aversion is the product 
of distinct pre-valuation and utility valuation mechanisms.  
Our results have important implications for how we interpret people’s tendency to reject 
mixed gambles. Given that multiple mechanisms cause loss aversion, attributing heterogeneity in 
acceptance rates to utility weighting alone may cause serious reverse inference problems: 
Variables originally attributed to utility weighting may be better understood in terms of pre-
valuation bias tendencies (especially as the latter correlate more strongly with individual-level 
acceptance rates). For example, the well-known finding that ventral striatum activity correlates 
with mixed gamble rejection rates (Tom et al., 2007) could be due to the relationship between 
brain activity and the pre-valuation bias rather than the relationship between brain activity and 
utility weighting, as is commonly assumed. Additional research is needed to untangle these 
relationships and future work should consider the possibility that gamble rejection rates, as well 
as the psychological, clinical and neurobiological correlates of high rejection rates, can be 
understood in terms of multiple different psychological mechanisms (including those at play 
prior to the formation of utility).  
The findings of this paper also add theoretical nuance to some recently documented 
empirical results regarding loss aversion. Walasek and Stewart (2015), for example, find that loss 
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aversion can be altered by altering the distribution of gambles shown to participants. More 
recently, Walasek and Stewart (2019) showed that such effects can be captured by the composite 
measure of the additive bias (in the logistic regression) and asymmetric weighting of gains and 
losses. Our findings that the HP and LP conditions in Experiment 2 differ in terms of their drift 
rates identifies the psychological mechanism responsible for this phenomenon: It is gamble 
valuation, and not the pre-valuation response tendency, that is affected by relative comparisons 
with previously experienced gambles. Additionally, by showing that the pre-valuation bias is an 
important mechanism underlying loss aversion, we are able to explain why loss aversion 
diminishes when the accept-reject task is reframed as a choice between the gamble and a sure 
outcome of zero (Ert & Erev, 2008, 2013): The choice task does not involve an explicit status 
quo, and thus participants are less likely to develop a pre-valuation bias. In a preliminary study 
(not reported in the current paper) we have confirmed this hypothesis by explicitly fitting the 
proposed DDM model to mixed gamble choices. In future work we plan to build off these results 
in order to provide a more detailed formal account of the contextual determinants of loss 
aversion.  
Our study of the pre-valuation bias also raises many new research questions. For 
example, we have shown that the pre-valuation bias adapts to prior experience, with a less 
rewarding environment predisposing participants towards rejection decisions and a more 
rewarding environment disposing participants towards acceptance decisions. However, there are 
important asymmetries in this process. For example, Experiment 1 offers gambles that have, on 
average, equal sized gains and losses, and thus an average expected value of zero. Yet it finds 
that there is an overall pre-valuation bias for rejection. Similarly, in Experiment 2 we find that 
participants are reluctant to shift the pre-valuation bias towards the acceptance boundary. Even 
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though participants in the high payoff condition received highly attractive gambles with large 
positive expected values, they still displayed a mild pre-valuation tendency to reject.  
Does this resistance to positive pre-valuation biases reflect tendencies to reject gambles 
established outside of the lab? It seems so. We performed additional analyses using the first 25 
gambles completed by each participant (which constitute the first half of the first experimental 
block). With limited within-experiment experience, pre-valuation biases should be reflective of 
participants’ life experiences and pre-experimental response tendencies. We found that the 
behavioral marker for the pre-valuation bias was also observable at the very beginning of the 
experiments (Figure 8), indicating that participants might bring a negative pre-valuation bias into 
the experiment. To better understand why this happens researchers need to develop models that 
specify the relationship between risky choice and long-term experience in everyday decision 
environments. There have been some attempts at this (see e.g. Leuker et al., 2018; Pleskac & 
Hertwig, 2014; Stewart et al., 2006; Stewart, Reimers & Harris, 2015), and future work should 
apply the insights of this research program to the study of the psychological mechanisms 
underpinning loss aversion.  
The predominant approach in modeling risky choice involves computing subjective 
expected utility of gambles. Our paper suggests that using a dynamic cognitive model can enable 
us to make interpretations regarding a fuller set of psychological mechanisms underlying these 
decisions. Going from interpretations to predictions, risky models that take into account multiple 
cognitive processes also make better out-of-sample predictions for human choice, compared to 
models based on computing subjective expected utilities (e.g., Erev, Ert, Plonsky et al., 2017). 
Our work therefore also contributes to the growing body of research showing the role of 
information processing in interpreting various parameters of descriptive models of choice 
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(Ashby, Yechiam, & Ben-Eliezer, 2018; Pachur, Schulte-Mecklenbeck, Murphy, & Hertwig, 
2018). 
The tests presented in this paper rely on drift diffusion model fits to choice and RT data. 
Without this modeling framework we would not be able to identify and measure the pre-
valuation bias. The validity of the drift diffusion model (including the importance of the starting 
point bias) has been shown in prior experiments involving perceptual, lexical, motor tasks 
(Forstmann, Ratcliff, & Wagenmakers, 2016; Mulder, Wagenmakers, Ratcliff, Boekel, & 
Forstmann, 2012; Ratcliff & Rouder, 2000; Ratcliff, Gomez, & McKoon, 2004; Ratcliff, Smith, 
Brown, & McKoon, 2016; White & Poldrack, 2014), and preferential choice tasks (Bhatia, 2014; 
Busemeyer & Townsend, 1993; Clay et al., 2017; Dai & Busemeyer, 2014; Krajbich, Armel, & 
Rangel, 2010; Philiastides & Ratcliff, 2013; Trueblood, et al., 2014; Tsetsos et al., 2016; Turner, 
et al., 2018; Zhao et al., 2019). We further illustrate the value of this approach for understanding 
the psychological processes at play in acceptance-rejection decisions for a mixed gamble task. 
The dynamic modeling approach has also been used to study other risk preferences, including 
binary choices between gambles (e.g., Diederich & Trueblood, 2018), and even riskless choices 
involving the integration of gain and loss attributes (e.g., Horn, Mata & Pachur, 2020). The 
mechanisms decomposed from such models can be connected to gaze allocation, pupil dilation, 
and brain activities (e.g., Basten, Biele, Heekeren & Fiebach, 2010; Shengn, Ramakrishnan, 
Seok, et al., 2020; Turner, Forstmann & Steyvers, 2019). These results suggest that the DDM, 
and related dynamic models, offer a cohesive general framework, one that can describe how 
decisions begin, how they unfold over time, how they are terminated, and how they can be 
separated into several measurable and interpretable mechanisms. Such models are necessary to 
bridge the gap between formal cognitive theory and observable behavioral and physiological 
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outcomes with real world consequence, and we look forward to their continued application to the 
study of human decision making. 
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(C) 
 
Figure 1. A: The drift diffusion model. The x-y axes represent time and accumulation state 
respectively. The arrow represents the expected accumulation process and its slope is the drift 
rate v, which corresponds to gamble utility. Each trajectory represents a hypothetical decision 
trial that starts from 𝛾 and ends when one of the thresholds, 𝜃 or – 𝜃, is hit. Note that 𝛾 ranges 
from −1 to 1, and 𝛾 = 0 indicates a neutral starting point. When 𝛾 < 0, decision makers have a 
pre-valuation bias to reject gambles, and the RTs for choices in which gambles are rejected are 
shorter than those in which gambles accepted (as indicated by the two RT distributions in the 
figure). B: Examples of experimental stimuli. For each gamble, token values of gains and losses 
were displayed side-by-side in counterbalanced positions. Participants used keyboards to indicate 
their responses, and the specific key-response association was held constant in a block (50 trials). 
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the screen (red crosses for rejections and green circles for acceptances).  (C) Gain (green) and 
loss (red) amounts used in the experiments. Lighter colors indicate shared gambles in both the 
high-payoff (HP) and low-payoff (LP) conditions in Experiment 2. 
 
 
Gain/Loss =  1.75 Gain/Loss =  1.83 Gain/Loss =  1.25
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Figure 2. A: Average acceptance rates and the ratio of gains to losses, for each of the gambles 
used in the experiments. Error bars indicate standard errors across participants. B: Distributions 
of response times for acceptance and rejection choices in aggregate data. Dashed lines indicate 
medians of response times. C: Acceptance rates and RT differences for acceptance vs. rejection 
for each participant. D: Choice-RT relationships. Here the horizontal axis indicates RTs, which 
are adjusted for choice factors (gain and loss values) before being sorted into 5 bins. Trials with 
smaller (longer) adjusted RTs are on the left (right). The vertical axis indicates probabilities for 





































































































































● corr = 0.99
Exp. 1 Exp. 2: HP Exp. 2: LP






























































































































































































































































































































Figure 3. Posterior predictive check for model fits. A: Acceptance rates for participants. B: Mean 
RT for rejection decisions for participants. C: Mean RT for acceptance decisions for participants. 
D. Acceptance rates for gambles. In panels A-C, each dot represents a participant. In panel D, 
each dot represents a unique gamble. Error bars indicate 95% credible intervals. Corr 

















































































































































































































































































Figure 4. Participant-level estimates for the four DDM parameters. A: Prospect theory utility 
weighting bias. B: Fixed utility bias. C: Pre-valuation bias. Each dot represents a participant. 
Error bars indicate 95% credible intervals.  
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Figure 5. Choice-RT relationships for observed data (solid lines) and model simulated data  
(dashed lines) for the full model and for models restricting each of the three mechanisms. MAE: 
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Figure 6. Relationships between the estimated DDM parameters and acceptance rates. Each dot 
represents a participant. corrs: Spearman’s correlation coefficients. 
corrs = - 0.28
corrs = - 0.24
























































Figure 7. Analyses of shared gambles in Experiment 2. A: Disassociation between drift rates and 
pre-valuation biases across the HP and LP conditions. B: Disassociation between choice 
probabilities and RT differences across the HP and LP conditions. C: Effect of drift rates on 
acceptance probabilities. D: Effect of pre-valuation biases on acceptance probabilities. E: Effect 
of drift rates on averaged RT differences between acceptance and rejection decisions. F: Effect 
of pre-valuation biases on averaged RT differences between acceptance and rejection decisions. 
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Figure 8. Choice-RT behavioral marker for the first 25 trials (first half of the first block). 
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Interpretation Features Implication 
Pre-valuation 
bias 
𝛾 < 0 
A predisposition towards 
rejection, corresponding to 








rejection, and quicker 









Larger effect of losses 
relative to gains on utility 








rejection, but no 
difference in RTs in 
rejection vs. acceptance. 
Fixed utility 
bias 
𝛼 < 0 
 
Additive, bias in utility 
favoring rejection  
Stimulus-independent 
 




rejection, but no 
difference in RTs in 
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  𝜷𝐋 𝜷𝐆 𝛂 𝛄 𝜽 τ 
Exp. 1 
Mean 0.022 0.015 -0.032 -0.214 1.182 0.423 
Median 0.022 0.015 -0.031 -0.214 1.181 0.423 
2.5% 0.02 0.013 -0.207 -0.268 1.12 0.393 
97.5% 0.025 0.018 0.141 -0.161 1.248 0.456 
SD 0.001 0.001 0.089 0.027 0.033 0.016 
Exp 2: 
HP 
Mean 0.029 0.016 0.014 -0.065 1.226 0.422 
Median 0.029 0.016 0.016 -0.065 1.225 0.422 
2.5% 0.026 0.014 -0.246 -0.113 1.141 0.397 
97.5% 0.032 0.018 0.274 -0.017 1.317 0.448 
SD 0.002 0.001 0.133 0.025 0.045 0.013 
Exp. 2: 
LP 
Mean 0.013 0.016 -0.420 -0.316 1.412 0.397 
Median 0.013 0.016 -0.418 -0.316 1.411 0.396 
2.5% 0.011 0.013 -0.583 -0.354 1.333 0.370 
97.5% 0.015 0.019 -0.259 -0.278 1.496 0.425 
SD 0.001 0.001 0.082 0.019 0.041 0.014 
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Table 3. DICs of the full model and the three constrained models. The model eliminating the pre-





(𝜷𝑳 = 𝜷𝑮) 
Fixed utility 
constrained 
(𝜶 = 𝟎) 
Pre-valuation 
constrained 
(𝝀 = 𝟎) 
Exp. 1 17,184 17,548 17,372 18,141 
Exp. 2: HP 20,886 21,957 21,249 21,655 
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Table 4. Standardized regressions of participant-level acceptance rates on the utility weighting 
bias, the fixed utility bias, and the pre-valuation bias. Note that the pre-valuation bias has the 
largest coefficients and thus correlates with participant acceptance rates the most across all 










-0.013 0.043** 0.148*** 0.804 
[0.015] [0.016] [0.014] - 
Exp. 2: HP 
-0.066*** 0.098*** 0.152*** 0.908 
[0.016] [0.016] [0.011] - 
Exp. 2: LP 
-0.039** 0.020† 0.059*** 0.673 
[0.013] [0.011] [0.012] - 
 
Note. † indicates 𝑝 < .1; * indicates 𝑝 <  .05; ** indicates 𝑝 <  .01; *** indicates 𝑝 <  .001. 
Values in brackets indicate standard errors for regression coefficients. 
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Table 5.  Standardized regressions of participant-level acceptance rates on utility weighting and 








-0.025 0.124*** 0.468 
[0.020] [0.020] - 
Exp. 2: HP 
-0.158*** 0.220*** 0.736 
[0.019] [0.019] - 
Exp. 2: LP 
-0.056*** 0.043** 0.336 
[0.013] [0.013] - 
 
Note. † indicates 𝑝 < .1; * indicates 𝑝 <  .05; ** indicates 𝑝 <  .01; *** indicates 𝑝 <  .001. 
Values in brackets indicate standard errors for regression coefficients. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
